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Statement of Jurisdiction 
The Utah Court of Appeals claims jurisdiction over this appeal according to assignment by some 
Utah state statute, as it is an appeal from an order originating in a Utah state court in a divorce 
proceeding. However, Appellant continues to object to this assignment by statute, as the matters 
at hand are all constitutional based issues, and one of the core questions which has never been 
answered is, exactly how does statutory law even apply to the sovereign people in general? 
Statement of Issues and Standard for Review 
NOTE: The maxim of law dictates that the burden of proof falls upon him who is asserting, not 
upon him who is denying, yet the trial court has refused to adhere to that maxim of law and has 
allowed assumptions, presumptions, third-party opinions, the unsworn statements of counsel, 
and outright lies to stand as if they were somehow lawful evidence in these proceedings. 
1, When jurisdiction has been formally, 'squarely challenged,' must a trial court comply with 
all of the requirements of answering a lawfully executed jurisdictional challenge and prove 
factually upon the record by lawful evidence, all elements of jurisdiction being asserted, and 
would the failure to evidence such jurisdiction once challenged itself be considered a fraud, 
particularly when the only 'proof of jurisdiction offered by the trial court is a stipulation, the 
validity of which has been challenged as it is void for fraud and for lack of full disclosure -
or may a court merely ignore such a formal challenge, even if those claims of jurisdiction 
were acquired by fraud under threat, duress and coercion? 
a. Standard of Review. This court reviews this issue de novo and simultaneously reviews 
the trial court's alleged finding of jurisdiction to be in clear error as such claims fail 
the fundamental requirements of determinative law and due process as cited in this 
case due to the fraud perpetrated by the petitioner, her counsel and the trial court itself. 
b. Supporting Authority. Jurisdiction issues can be challenged even on appeal [Latana v. 
Hopper, 102 F. 2d 188; Chicago v. New York 37 F Supp. 150; Stuck v. Medical 
Examiners 94 Ca 2d 751, 211 P2d 389; Rosemond v. Lambert, 469 F 2d 416; Norman 
v. Zieber, 3 Or at 202-03; 1 Smith's Leading Cases, 816; Old Wayne Mut. L. Assoc, v. 
McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 27 S. Ct. 236 (1907); Standard v. Olsen, 74 S. Ct. 768; 
Sherar v. Cullen, 481 F.2d 946 (9th Cir. 1973); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 
363 (1978); Haines v. Kerner, 404 US 519; 40 L.Ed 2d 652; 92 S.Ct. 594 (1972); 
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436, p 491; Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516; Miller v. U.S. 230 F, 2d 486,489; 
Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 616; Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1856); Chisholm v. 
Georgia, 2 U.S. (Dall 2) 419,1 L. Ed. 440 (1793); 4 Wheat, 402; Basso v. Utah Power 
& Light Co. 495 F 2d 906,910; Hill Top Developers v. Holiday Pines Service Corp. 
478 So. 2d. 368 (Fla 2nd DCA 1985); Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Amendments to the US 
Constitution], 
c. Preservation of issue. This issue is preserved in the trial court throughout the docketed 
entries. As the Kerner doctrine requires that all filings made by one proceeding 
without counsel must be 'liberally construed/ the Notice of Removal and Automatic 
Stay recorded in the docket of the court on 9/14/2005 must be seen in light of its true 
nature - that of the first of a series of many formal jurisdictional challenges to the 
merely assumed and presumed jurisdiction of the court, all to which the court has 
refused to provide any lawfol evidence aside from stating that jurisdiction exists 
because Respondent 'agreed' to it through the (fraudulent) stipulation. Other 
jurisdictional challenges throughout the proceedings are included in the following 
filings: Objections to Petitioner's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law filed on 
10/21/2005; Demurrer, filed on 7/10/2005; Notice of Removal to Federal District 
Court filed on 11/10/2005; Request for Hearing on the Jurisdictional Challenge filed 
on 8/2/2006; Formal Jurisdictional Challenge filed on 7/17/2006; Memorandum in 
Support of Motion to Quash Petitioner's Motion for Entry of Default Divorce Decree 
filed on 11/01/2005; Memorandum in Support of Motion for Void Judgment, filed 
with Notice of Motion for Void Judgment on 10/25/2006; Notice of Objections and 
Motion for More Definitive Statements filed on 10/12/2006; Motion to Claim and 
Exercise Constitutional Rights filed on 7/25/2006; Verified Statement of Fact and 
Motion to Quash Petitioner's Motion for Interim Judgment filed on 5/30/2006; 
Motion to Reconsider Ruling Dated 8/30/06, Order Dated 8/14/06 and Request of 
Hearing filed on 9/14/06; Motion to Reconsider Order Striking Defendant's Filings; 
Imposing Sanctions; and Authorizing Interim Judgment filed on 9/18/06; and Notice 
of Non-Appearance and Request for Information filed on 4/5/06, yet the trial court has 
refused to provide any 'evidence5 of jurisdiction beyond the alleged stipulation -
which Respondent was coerced to enter into under duress, and which he subsequently 
discovered was void for fraud and for lack of full disclosure. If jurisdiction did not 
exist prior to the alleged stipulation, which Appellant asserts and which must be 
assumed based on the actions of the trial court* then the threats of a required 
'psychological evaluation' used against Respondent were a mere ruse used to coerce 
Respondent in an attempt to gain jurisdiction where factually none existed prior to the 
alleged stipulation itself. 
2. May jurisdiction be acquired lawfully by fraud or by threat, duress and coercion, or may it be 
conferred by a fraudulent contract, agreement or stipulation - one which itself is void for 
fraud and for lack of full disclosure - or must a stipulation comply with all of the necessary 
and essential elements of contract law, including but not limited to - the requirement of full 
disclosure of all of the terms and conditions of said contract, in order for it to be considered 
constitutionally compliant - or may essential elements of any contract, agreement or 
stipulation be left undisclosed at the injury and disadvantage of one party yet somehow still 
be considered a valid and binding agreement? 
a. Standard of Review. This court also reviews this issue de novo and simultaneously 
reviews the transcript of the proceedings on December 1, 2006 finding Judge Stott's 
refusal to answer this question to be a pure abuse of discretion and a fundamental 
denial of due process, and additionally reviews for clear error the fact that the trial 
court has made a flawed finding of fact and legal conclusion by its actions that a 
stipulation, itself void for fraud and for lack of frill disclosure, can convey jurisdiction 
be considered valid and binding upon all parties. 
b. Supporting Authority. [23 Am J2d Fraud §2; Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. 92, 95, 353 
S.E.2d 756,758 (1987); U.S. v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297,199; U.S. v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 
1021,1032; Carmine v. Bowen, 64 A.932; Morrison v. Coddington, 662 P. 2d. 155, 
135 Ariz. 480 (1983); Walls v. Walls, 99 S.W. 969,30 Ky. Law Rep. 948; Barber's 
Executors v. Baldwin's Executor, 138 Ky. 710,128 S.W. 1092; Livering's Executor v. 
Russell, 100 S.W. 840, 844, 30 Ky. Law Rep. 1185; United States v. Boch 
Oldsmobile, Inc., 909 F.2d 657, 661 (1st Cir. 1990); Orner v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307, 
1310 (10th Cir. 1994); Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Amendments to the US Constitution]. 
c. Preservation of issue. This issue is also preserved in the trial court, including but not 
limited to: Request for Hearing on the Jurisdictional Challenge filed on 8/2/2006; 
Formal Jurisdictional Challenge filed on 7/17/2006; Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Void Judgment, filed with Notice of Motion for Void Judgment on 
10/25/2006; Notice of Objections and Motion for More Definitive Statements filed on 
10/12/2006; Motion to Reconsider Ruling Dated 8/30/06, Order Dated 8/14/06 and 
Request of Hearing filed on 9/14/06; Motion to Reconsider Order Striking 
Defendant's Filings; Imposing Sanctions; and Authorizing Interim Judgment filed on 
9/18/06; and the transcript of the hearing itself held on December 1,2006, 
3. What constitutionally delegated authority allows the trial court to use hearsay as if it were 
lawful evidence, in particular by excluding an indispensible third party to these proceedings 
in order to rule on subject matter and make an in rem determination outside the scope of its 
charter and pretend it has congressionally delegated authority to abrogate treaty rights? 
a. Standard of Review. The trial court has erred in its determination that it had either 
subject matter or in rem jurisdiction to rule on the status and standing of, or abrogate 
the treaty rights of, members of the Pembina Nation in general, and appellant in 
particular, and has excluded an indispensible third-party from this dispute. The trial 
court has relied upon mere hearsay in its finding of fact that the Pembina Nation or its 
members have no claims to treaty rights under the 1863 treaty, or that Appellant is not 
of Native American descent and has no claim under the 1778,1863 or 1866 treaties, 
which treaties appellant stands under. Therefore, this court reviews this subject and 
the transcript of the proceedings on December 1,2006 for clear error in allowing 
hearsay to stand as lawful evidence and to fail to join an indispensible third party to 
the proceedings. Additionally, the court reviews this issue de novo to declare a finding 
of law that the subject matter of the status and standing of the Pembina Nation lies 
outside of the trial court's limited jurisdiction. 
b. Supporting Authority. [Dillon v. Dillon, 187 P 27; People v. Ruiz (1990) 217 Cal. 
App. 3d 574, 265 Cal. Rptr. 886; Williamson v. Berry, 8 How. 945, 540 12 L. Ed. 
1170, 1189 (1850); Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall 335, 352; Turtle Mountain Band of 
Chippewa Indians v. United States, 490 F.2d 935, 951 (Ct. CI. 1974); Bradley v. 
Fisher; 13 Wall 335, 352; U.S. v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905); UNITED STATES of 
America et al., Plaintiffs, and Samish, Snohomish, Snoqualime and Steilacoom Indian 
Tribes, Plaintiffs-Intervenor/Appellants, and Duwamish Indian Tribe, Plaintiff-
Intervenor/Appellant, v. STATE OF WASHINGTON et al., Defendants.641 F.2d 
1368 (1981), United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit; Hill Top Developers v. 
Holiday Pines Service Corp. 478 So. 2d. 368 (Fla 2nd DCA 1985); Lubben v. 
Selective Service System, 453 F.2d 645, 649 (1st Cir. 1972); Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. 
65, at 66 (1857); Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. 92,95,353 S.E.2d 756, 758 (1987); Orner v. 
Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307,1310 (10th Cir. 1994); Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Amendments to 
the US Constitution; Old Crossing Treaty of 1863; 1778 and 1866 Treaties], 
c. Preservation of issue. This issue is preserved in the trial court record throughout the 
docketed entries, including: Notice of Removal and Automatic Stay filed on 
9/14/2005; Objections to Petitioner's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law filed on 
10/21/2005; Notice of Removal to Federal District Court filed on 11/10/2005; formal 
Jurisdictional Challenge filed on 7/17/2006; Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Quash Petitioner's Motion for Entry of Default Divorce Decree filed on 11/01/2005; 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Void Judgment, filed with Notice of Motion 
for Void Judgment on 10/25/2006; Notice of Objections and Motion for More 
Definitive Statements filed on 10/12/2006; Verified Statement of Fact and Motion to 
Quash Petitioner's Motion for Interim Judgment filed on 5/30/2006; Motion to 
Reconsider Ruling Dated 8/30/06, Order Dated 8/14/06 and Request of Hearing filed 
on 9/14/06; Motion to Reconsider Order Striking Defendant's Filings; Imposing 
Sanctions; and Authorizing Interim Judgment filed on 9/18/06; 
4. Do the due process clauses require that the people are entitled to responsive answers from 
their government servants to their specific questions, especially when requesting revelation 
of the nature and cause of any proceedings against them, so that they may be able to defend 
themselves in those proceedings, or may a judicial officer merely refuse to provide 
responsive answers to those questions - even when those questions are being asked in order 
to determine the nature and cause of the proceedings against him, or may a judicial officer 
even use tactics that invoke fear and intimidation in an individual, so that he is prevented 
from being able to ask further questions and thereby is unable to properly defend himself in a 
proceeding? 
a. Standard of Review. This court reviews this issue for clear error. There is absolutely 
no discretion in this area to abuse the unalienable rights of the individual to be heard 
and to refuse to provide responsive answers to his questions so that he could be able 
to understand the nature and cause of the proceedings against him and be able to 
properly defend himself. Substantive due process refers to a requirement that laws and 
regulations be related to a legitimate government interest (e.g., crime prevention) and 
not contain provisions that result in the unfair or arbitrary treatment of an individual. 
Fundamental to procedural due process are adequate notice before the government 
can deprive one of life, liberty, or property, and the opportunity to be heard and 
defend one's rights. This is protected by the 5th Amendment to the Constitution for the 
United States. There is no discretion in this area to abuse the fundamental rights of the 
individual to be heard and to provide responsive answers to his questions so that he 
can understand the nature and cause of the proceedings against him. 
b. Supporting Authority. [Eckel v. MacNeal, 628 N.E.2d 741 (111. App. Dist. 1993); 28 
USC Sec. 455; Marshall v. Jerrico Inc., 446 US 238,242,100 S.Ct 1610,64 L. Ed. 
2d 182 (1980); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,259-262, 266-267 (1978); State v. 
Mooney, 2004 WL 1380539, Docket No. 20010787); Wuest v. Wuest, 127 P2d 934, 
937; Yates Vs. Village of Hoffinan Estates, Illinois, 209 F.Supp. 757 (NX). 111. 1962); 
Owen v. Independence, 100 S.C.T. 1398,445 US 622; Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 
232,1974; Downs v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Stone v Powell, 428 US 465,483 
n. 35,96 S. Ct. 3037,49 L. Ed. 2d 1067 (1976); Merritt v. Hunter, C.A. Kansas 170 
F2d 739; Cooper Vs. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S.Ct. 1401 (1958); Article VI, Sections 2-
3 of the U.S. Constitution; US v Will, 449 US 200, 216,101 S. Ct., 471, 66 L.Ed.2nd 
392,406 (1980); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 US (6 Wheat) 264,404, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821); 
Brown v. Hummel, 6 Pa 86 (1847); Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856); 
Taylor v. Porter (4 Hill, 145); Taylor v. Porter., 4 Hill. 140,146 (1843) Justice 
Bronson; State v. Simon., 2 Spears 761,767 (1884) Justice O'Neal; United States v. 
Boch Oldsmobile, Inc., 909 F.2d 657, 661 (1st Cir. 1990); Jaffe and Asher v. Van 
Brunt, S.D.N.Y. 1994, 158 F.R.D. 278; Walls v. Walls, 99 S.W. 969, 30 Ky. Law Rep. 
948; Barber's Executors v. Baldwin's Executor, 138 Ky. 710,128 S.W. 1092; 
Livering's Executor v. Russell, 100 S.W. 840, 844,30 Ky. Law Rep. 1185; United 
States vs. Lee, 106 U.S. [196,] 220, [27 L.Ed. 171,1 S. Ct. 240] (1882); 438 US, at 
506,57 L. Ed. 2d 895,98 S. Ct. 2894; 261 Kan. At 862; United States v. Boch 
Oldsmobile, Inc. 909 F.2d 657,661 (1st Cir. 1990); Fifth, Sixth and Seventh 
Amendments to the US Constitution; Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution], 
c. Preservation of issue. This issue is preserved in the trial court record throughout the 
docketed entries, including: Demurrer, filed on 7/10/2005; formal Jurisdictional 
Challenge filed on 7/17/2006; Memorandum in Support of Motion for Void Judgment, 
filed with Notice of Motion for Void Judgment on 10/25/2006; Notice of Objections 
and Motion for More Definitive Statements filed on 10/12/2006; Motion to Claim and 
Exercise Constitutional Rights filed on 7/25/2006; Verified Statement of Fact and 
Motion to Quash Petitioner's Motion for Interim Judgment filed on 5/30/2006; 
Motion to Reconsider Ruling Dated 8/30/06, Order Dated 8/14/06 and Request of 
Hearing filed on 9/14/06; Motion to Reconsider Order Striking Defendant's Filings; 
Imposing Sanctions; and Authorizing Interim Judgment filed on 9/18/06. 
5. What presumption of law is the trial court operating under to pretend that constitutionally 
delegated authority exists or alternately, what exact Article, Section and Clause of the 
constitutions grants the government unlimited power and authority to regulate the affairs of 
the people while acting in their private, non-commercial capacities by imposing statutory law 
upon them without their knowledge or informed consent, or even against their will? 
a. Standard of Review. The court reviews this issue for clear error by the trial court 
which has failed to respond to this question Respondent has raised to expose the exact 
source of delegated authority for the imposition of this body of law against the people. 
The error to be reviewed is the imposition of statutory law against Respondent in 
these proceedings without his knowledge or consent and also against his will, and 
then failing to respond to the question regarding the source of this alleged authority, 
as silence equates to fraud. This question is of particular interest to the general public 
and novel as the people need to know by what constitutionally delegated authority 
they are being subjected to unlimited governmental regulation and control. 
b. Supporting Authority. There is no constitutionally delegated authority to impose this 
body of law against the sovereign people without their knowledge or consent, or 
especially against their will [Yick Wo v. Hopkins (118 U.S. 356,370); Kawananakoa 
v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353,27 S. Ct. 526, 527, 51 L. Ed. 834 (1907); Lansing vs. 
Smith, 21 D.89; Martin vs. Waddell, 41 US (16 Pet) 367,410 (1842); 4 Wheat, 402; 
Jillird v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421; United Bank vs. Mesa Nelson Co., 121 Ariz 438, 
590 P2d 1384,25 U.C.C.RS 1113; Wilson v. Omaha Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 667 (1979); 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S., 147,174,176; Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S., 238; 
Norton vs. Shelby County, 118, US 425 p. 442; 16 Am Jur 2d, Sec. 177, late 2d, Sec 
256; Downes v. Bidwell (1901) 21 S.Ct. 770,182 U.S. 244,45 Led. 1088; United 
States v. Price Et Al. 383 U.S. 787; 86 S.Ct. 1152; 1966 U.S. Lexis 1963; Brown v. 
Hummel, 6 Pa 86 (1847); Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856); Taylor v. Porter 
(4 Hill, 145); Wynhammer v. People, 13 NY (378); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43; 
Curley vs. U.S., 130 F. 1, 8,64 CCA. 369; Cruden v. Neale, 2 N.C. 338 (1796) 2 S.E. 
70; Starkey Construction Inc. vs, Eicon, Inc., 248 Ark 958,978A, 457 SW 2nd 509, 7 
U.C.CRS 923; the Preambles to the constitutions; Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Ninth 
Amendments to the US Constitution]. 
c. Preservation of issue. This issue is preserved in the trial court record throughout the 
docketed entries, including; Memorandum in Support of Motion for Void Judgment, 
filed with Notice of Motion for Void Judgment on 10/25/2006; Demurrer, filed on 
7/10/2005; Notice of Objections and Motion for More Definitive Statements filed on 
10/12/2006; Motion to Reconsider Ruling Dated 8/30/06, Order Dated 8/14/06 and 
Request of Hearing filed on 9/14/06; Motion to Reconsider Order Striking 
Defendant's Filings; Imposing Sanctions; and Authorizing Interim Judgment filed on 
9/18/06; and the transcript of the hearing itself held on December 1,2006. 
NOTE: What the constitution does not allow, it strictly prohibits. The constitution strictly 
prohibits the treasonous high crime of denial of due process and violation of the 
unalienable rights of the people. 
Constitutional and Treaty Provisions whose interpretation will determine the outcome of 
this appeal as detailed in the addendum 
Constitutional Law and Treaty Law: US Constitution: Preamble, Article VI, Sections 2-3, 
Amendments I, V, VI, VII and IX; Utah Constitution; Preamble, Article I, Section 7; 1778 
Treaty: Article IV; 1863 Old Crossing Treaty: Article 1; 1866 Treaty: Articles 7, 8 Section 4, 8 
Section 8, 38, and 45. 
Statement of the Case 
This case involves a family court making several errors in law and of a trial court judge refusing 
to do his duty to be 'fair to all litigants,' refusing to provide due process of law, and acting 
inconsistent with a required oath of office. The questions being presented are all supported 
favorably by Supreme Court decisions and are all fully backed by constitutional and 
international treaty law, yet the trial court judge appears to have shown bias and prejudice 
against Respondent, a member of a tribal nation which is not considered 'federally recognized' 
yet maintains rights under the treaties. 
More importantly though, the trial court judge has refused to provide due process of law and 
factually prove jurisdiction, which merely assumed and presumed jurisdiction has been formally 
and squarely challenged on multiple occasions. This is a violation of Article VI, Sections 2-3 of 
the US constitution, and it is also a violation of the law which all state and federal employees are 
subject to [United States vs. Lee, 106 U.S. [196,] 220, [27 L.Ed. 171,1 S, Ct 240] (1882); 438 
US, at 506, 57 L, Ed, 2d 895,98 S- Ct. 2894]. The orders, rulings and judgments were therefore 
not made by a judge acting in a judicial capacity, but by a man acting under color of law 
committing high crimes of treason by making war against the highest law of the land. 
Statement of facts relevant to the issues presented for review: 
On or about September 7, 2005, the Petitioner, Tamara Lynn Mulder, filed the above referenced 
action in the Fourth District Court - Utah County, Provo Division (record, page 5)- Shortly 
thereafter, Respondent was accosted by a process server in Ogden, Utah and 'served' with this 
lawsuit (record, page 13). Immediately thereafter, Respondent exercised his treaty rights and 
filed a Notice of Removal and Automatic Stay in this case, removing the case to Federal Tribal 
Circuit Court - the proper venue and jurisdiction for adjudicating a legal dispute between two 
active, registered tribal members in good standing belonging to the Pembina Nation Little Shell 
Band of North America (record, page 8). 
The Fourth District Court, without any disclosed congressionally delegated authority, abrogated 
Respondent's treaty rights and ignored the removal to tribal court, by the following sequence of 
events: the petitioner's filing of a Motion for Entry of Default Divorce Decree (record, page 
121), Memorandum in Support of said motion (record, page 102) and Affidavit by Tamara 
Mulder in support of that motion (record, page 109), followed by respondent's filings of a 
Motion to Quash Petitioner's Motion for Entry of Default Divorce (record, page 138), Objection 
to Petitioner's Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law document (record, page 133), Rebuttal 
to Affidavit of Tamara Mulder (record, page 153), and Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Quash (record, page 172), all of which reminded the court that the case had been removed from 
its presumed jurisdiction under international treaty law, yet judge Stott proceeded as if no such 
Removal had ever been filed. When Respondent learned of the trial court's refusal to honor 
international treaty law, he subsequently removed the case to Federal District Court by filing the 
case in the Utah District Court and entering a Notice of Removal into the case (record, page 
178). Two judges recused themselves and refused to rule on the case. Then another judge, 
without giving any explanation of how Utah state statutory law could override international 
treaty law, 'remanded' the case back to state court (see docket of United States District Court for 
the District of Utah - Central Division, case number 2:05CV00919). 
Meanwhile, the Fourth District Court, ignored this removal as well by holding a hearing on 
December 1,2005 to which respondent had to hire an 'emergency' appearance of counsel at that 
hearing, as he could not understand why the removal to federal court was ignored by Judge Stott 
(record, page 276). The court, petitioner and her counsel acted in collusion to see that false and 
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fraudulent claims were made on the record in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
(record, page 302), which were unsupported by fact or law, but rather by mere hearsay and by 
outright lies made in the Affidavit of Tamara Mulder in Support of Motion for Entry of Default 
Judgment (record, page 109). Specifically, one of the following false claims made by the 
petitioner in her above referenced Affidavit has been rebutted by respondent, yet all the lies of 
the petitioner have been accepted as fact by the court: "I am not aware of any significant Indian 
bloodlines or heritage in Defendant's family. If Defendant has any biological claim to being 
Indian, he is less than 1/16th Indian", yet petitioner knew full well that respondent is of at least 
3716th verifiable Choctaw Native American descent, which fact is verified by the genealogical 
records of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, and such evidence is filed as an 
exhibit to the Motion for Void Judgment (record, page 743), and all the remaining lies of the 
petitioner were also rebutted in respondent's Rebuttal to Affidavit of Tamara Mulder (record, 
page 153). The petitioner's counsel submitted hearsay after hearsay in his Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Entry of Default Judgment (record, page 102) in an attempt to 'prove' 
that the Pembina Nation Little Shell Band of North America had no claims under the 1863 Old 
Crossing treaty, yet failed to produce any original first-hand witnesses or Affidavit of testimony 
supporting such a claim. 
The trial court, without any lawful evidence supporting the claims of the petitioner and her 
counsel, then erred by stating the following in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
(record, page 302): claiming that respondent 'failed to file any answer, motion to dismiss, or 
other pleading required by Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure', but failed to prove 
factually how Utah Statutory Law had any jurisdiction or authority over respondent; yet claimed 
that the court had in personam and subject matter jurisdiction, and that there was 'no treaty' 
requiring recognition of any documents from the Pembina Nation, yet again, placed no facts on 
the record showing how it was lawfully determined, through due process proceedings, that the 
lineal descendants of the Pembina Nation, either by birth or adoption, did not have any valid 
claims under the 1863 Treaty [contrary to the findings of the Supreme Court, Court of Claims in 
Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians v. United States, 490 F.2d 935, 951 (Ct CL 1974)], 
or show how Utah statutory law had the power and authority to override international treaty law 
[and Article VI, Section 2 of the US Constitution], or how any documents filed under the 
authority of international treaty law could be considered a 'legal nullity' with no force or effect 
upon the plaintiff or the court. 
Thus the court and the Petitioner, by and through her counsel, having ignored Respondent's 
treaty rights and unalienable rights to due process of law, and also having ignored the removal to 
Federal District Court, exercised a scheme of threat, duress and coercion by their actions against 
Respondent. This placed respondent under a great deal of stress and duress and thus caused him 
to capitulate into a 'settlement' and stipulation on December 7,2007, by withholding that which 
was most dear to him - access to his beloved children, by the threats made in the 'Findings of 
Fact' (record, page 302) that he would be 'awarded reasonable rights of visitation [to his own 
children] after an evaluation and further hearing to determine the conditions of such visitation5. 
Respondent, although unconvinced that the trial court had the jurisdiction and authority to do 
what it was doing, simply wanted the best for his children, and so under a state of duress, signed 
the (unconscionable) alleged Stipulation (record, page 297). At the time, however, Respondent 
was unaware that a fraud was being perpetrated against him - first by the trial court itself 
assuming, presuming and thereby utilizing threats ('ordering' that Respondent would be 
required to undergo an evaluation before he would be allowed to see his own children again) in 
order to assert jurisdiction which had never been factually proven; and second, by the Petitioner 
herself in failing to disclose all of the terms and conditions of the alleged agreement - as failure 
to disclose is intentional injury and the very foundation and essence of fraud. 
The Petitioner made it very clear by her actions and statements that she intended Respondent to 
believe that the children were all located in Utah at that time (Stipulation; record, page 297: #7b, 
#12). But factually, she had already taken three of the minor children and moved them and 
herself to Massachusetts on or after November 1, 2005 - before the hearing on a 'Protective 
Order' on November 10, 2005 - wherein the judge claimed that she 'intended' on maintaining 
residency in Utah - and prior to the alleged Divorce hearing, which took place on or about 
December 1, 2005 at which Respondent was not in attendance, as he was unaware that the trial 
court judge would not honor the removal of the case to Federal District Court. The petitioner 
through her counsel has already admitted on the record that she and the children were no longer 
living in the state of Utah at the time of the signing of the alleged stipulation. 
On the day of the alleged settlement, prior to the time of a scheduled court hearing, an alleged 
'agreement' was reached called the Stipulation in this case (record, page 297), During that time 
before the hearing, there was a verbal agreement made by the Petitioner and her counsel that 
after the signing of the Stipulation, the children's grandfather - who was with Respondent at the 
time - would be allowed to take the children Christmas shopping. However, immediately after 
the alleged signing of the stipulation, the Petitioner refused to honor this agreement, and stated 
that it was 'impossible' because the children were all 'scattered across the state/ When 
Respondent's father, the children's grandfather, stated that he had driven clear from California 
to see them and that he would be willing to drive further to see them, the Petitioner flatly refused. 
Only later was it learned that the reason the Petitioner refused visitation of the children was 
because she was deceitful about the whereabouts of the minor children and refused to let their 
grandfather see them as it was physically impossible, since the three youngest children were in 
or near Athol, Massachusetts at the time. Respondent, his father, Mr. Hard, and a Mr. 
Christiansen were all witnesses to this fraud that was perpetrated on Respondent by the 
Petitioner. Since that time, other witnesses have come forward and would be willing to testify 
about the fraud that was committed against the respondent on that day. 
A few months later, Respondent began to learn about the fraud that had been perpetrated against 
him, and motioned to have the stipulation set aside (record, page 331) and tried to get evidence 
via subpoena submitted into the case to uncover that fraud. Before respondent could have those 
subpoenas served on the parties, Mr. Hard succeeded in getting them quashed (record, pages 406, 
411, 435, 455); in a successful attempt to hide the fraud perpetrated by his client. 
Frustrated with the lack of justice he had been subjected to, Respondent began to exercise his 
first amendment protected right to free speech and to petition for redress of grievances and 
began to file certain papers into the case in an attempt to expose the fraud and sever himself 
from any liability associated with the fraud (record, pages 402,442, 448,465,476,485). 
The trial court, in yet another attempt to silence Respondent, tampered with the court record and 
'ordered9 that those filings be 'removed9 from the records of the case (record, page 679), and has 
by its actions determined that the common law has no bearing or authority in the case, yet the 
constitution and treaties - all common law documents - are still the highest law of the land. 
Respondent filed these documents in an attempt to get the trial court to comply with the 
constitution and the treaties, and to get the trial court judge to honor and uphold his required 
oath of office (record, pages 580, 582). Every single one of Respondent's motions and requests 
for information were flatly and profusely denied (record, pages 615, 631, 679), yet one 
particular filing - that of a motion to claim and exercise those rights protected by the 
constitutions (record, page 582) - was of particular interest, as when it was denied Respondent 
finally realized that the trial court did not recognize, honor or uphold the constitution and 
treaties as the supreme law of the land. 
Finally, thoroughly disgusted with the multitude of violations of his rights, Respondent then 
filed a Motion for Void Judgment into the case in October, 2006 (record, page 743), listing 
eighteen constitutional violations committed by the trial court and judge. However, although a 
request to submit for decision was promptly filed, the trial court has thus far refused to rule on 
the matter [See: Orner v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307, 1310 (10th Cir. 1994)]. Rather, Mr. Hard, with 
the collusion of Judge Stott, obtained an 'end run9 around the process by immediately filing an 
Ex Parte 'Motion for Order to Show Cause9 (record, page 747) right after Respondent's Motion 
for Void Judgment was filed, and the court promptly acted on that motion (record, page 764) in 
a further attempt to try and silence Respondent - to try and get him to 'just shut up and comply' 
with the void orders of the court. This attempt was further revealed at the 'hearing' held on 
December 1,2007, and is the basis from which this appeal arises. 
On that day, Respondent was under a great deal of stress and duress (transcript, line 12 - which 
should read 'coercion', not 'collusion') and made it clear that he was not an attorney and that he 
did not understand the nature and cause of the proceedings at hand (transcript, lines 21-23). Yet 
when attempting to ask questions to uncover neccessary information, he was again coerced into 
silence by the trial court judge. First the judge refused to give him responsive answers to his 
questions (transcript, lines 9, 12-13, 20) or refused to answer them at all (transcript, lines 20-21, 
24) and then he motioned to the bailiff as if to come and take Respondent away (transcript, 
between lines 23 and 24), in a further attempt to silence Respondent so that the judge did not 
have to answer any more of his questions - questions which were designed for the disclosure 
and revelation of jurisdiction/venue/standing/authority/duty in order to properly understand the 
nature and cause of the proceedings at hand. 
Later in the hearing, when confronted with specific points of law, as Respondent was 
questioning how the proceedings could even be considered valid when the underlying contract 
upon which the court presumed jurisdiction itself was void for fraud and for lack of foil 
disclosure, the trial court judge boldly stated: "I'm not going to answer that" (transcript, lines 
20-21). This act in and of itself is again, a complete and utter denial of due process of law. 
Either the people have an absolute right to know and see proof of jurisdiction(s), venue, standing, 
authorities, offices and of any "known duty" to which they may be compelled under threat of 
sanction, or they do not and are mere slaves, subject to every whim of government regulation 
and control. 
Summary of Arguments 
The matter now before this court can be summarized as simply this: The failure of the trial court 
to evidence jurisdiction, the utter and blatant denial and abrogation of unalienable rights and 
treaty rights and the failure to prove factually how statutory law applies to the sovereign people 
acting in their private capacities. 
What is required in order to establish jurisdiction - can assumptions, presumptions, third-party 
information, the unsworn statements of counsel and outright lies be used as 'evidence9 to prove 
jurisdiction? Can a court merely assume, presume and assert jurisdiction, without it being 
proven factually upon the record with lawful evidence supporting such claims and assertions? 
Can threats of physical violence and force be used to 'prove9 asserted yet unverified claims of 
jurisdiction? Can sanctions be imposed absent verified proof of jurisdiction? Can common law 
'criminal penalties9 of contempt be brought when jurisdiction has been consistently challenged 
and never proven factually upon the record, with lawful evidence*! Can a contract or 'stipulation9, 
itself void for fraud and for lack of frill disclosure, be used to pretend that jurisdiction exists? 
Can jurisdiction be conveyed by fraud, or by threat, duress and coercion? Can unalienable rights, 
those protected by the constitutions, be violated at the mere whim of any judicial officer? Does 
any court have authority to abrogate treaty rights and rule on a treaty without any lawful 
evidence supporting those claims? Can the constitutions and the treaties, esteemed as the highest 
law of the land, simply be ignored and overridden by mere statutory law provisions? Can 
statutory law, a body of law which is foreign to and separate from the constitutions, be used to 
arbitrarily and capriciously strip away the rights of the sovereign people, without their 
knowledge or informed consent, or even against their will? Should the sovereign people - of 
whom, by whom, and for whom all government was created (and the very purpose of the 
creation of a republican form of government was to protect the people's rights) - be subjected to 
unlimited regulation and control, thereby creating within them a state of involuntary servitude? 
The obvious answer to these, and many similar questions raised in this case, should be 'no5 - yet 
this is the very reason Respondent has had to appeal these issues, as the Rights of one of the 
people have been gravely violated by the magistrate of the Fourth District Court, working in 
collusion with the Appellee and her counsel in the violation of those unalienable Rights. 
The trial court has operated in gross error, outside of all constitutional limitations placed upon it 
and has persisted in its attempts to coerce Respondent into being silenced. Although Respondent 
has been placed under states of duress many times throughout these proceedings due to the 
lawless actions of the trial court and judge, he refuses to simply give in to threats and coercion. 
Due to the sheer magnitude of constitutional violations by the trial court, which in and of itself 
is simply horrendous - the orders, rulings and judgments entered by the court are not merely 
voidable, but unquestionably void as the court did not merely exceed its presumed jurisdiction, 
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but acted entirely outside of all limitations placed upon it by the chains of constitutional law. 
Respondent is of verifiable Choctaw Native American ancestry by birth and is a lineal 
descendant by adoption into the Pembina Nation, and the trial court has also repeatedly violated 
and refused to recognize Respondent's treaty rights. That error alone makes any and all 
judgments rendered by the court null and void, ab initio, for violation of international treaty law. 
Because of the fraud brought into the trial court by the petitioner and her counsel, and the utter 
and blatant denial of due process of law by the court, Respondent has become an injured party in 
fact in these proceedings. No valid rights can accrue from the void actions of the trial court and 
Respondent cannot be precluded by estoppel from challenging the void acts and judgments of 
the trial court. 
Appellant therefore respectfully requests that this court find in his favor, and reverse the 
erroneous decisions made by the trial court, and demand that the trial court provide due process 
of law as protected by the federal and state constitutions. Due to the fraud and blatant denial of 
due process, the relief demanded is not merely discretionary, but is rather mandatory, and 
appellant hereby expects this court to protect his Rights and act in full compliance with all 
constitutional and international treaty law. 
Argument 
Point 1 
When jurisdiction is formally, "squarely challenged9, a trial court must comply with all 
requirements of proving factually upon the record, all elements of jurisdiction being asserted, by 
lawful evidence, and the failure to evidence such claims of jurisdiction is a fraud, particularly 
when the only "evidence9 offered to the assertion of jurisdiction is an alleged stipulation which 
itself is void for fraud and for lack of full disclosure. 
There is no lawful evidence upon the records of the trial court proving jurisdiction as has 
constantly been asserted by the court - most recently asserted by threats of physical violence 
and force of incarceration for 'contempt9 in a further attempt to silence Respondent and to get 
him to merely 'shut up and comply9 with the void orders of the court. Yet is well settled in law 
that once challenged, jurisdiction cannot be assumed it must be proved to exist - not by mere 
statements that 'the court has jurisdiction9 - but by facts and lawful evidence [Latana v. Hopper, 
102 F. 2d 188; Chicago v. New York 37 F Supp. 150; Stuck v. Medical Examiners 94 Ca 2d 751, 
211 P2d 389; Rosemond v. Lambert, 469 F 2d 416]. 
The only 'proof of jurisdiction the trial court has submited is an alleged stipulation which itself 
is void for fraud and for lack of full disclosure. Denial of remedy is intentional injury. It is well 
established in law that the People are entitled to know and see proof of jurisdiction(s), venue, 
standing, authorities, offices and of any "known duty" to which they may be compelled under 
threat of sanction, and that it is the incumbent duty of officers, agents and employees of 
governments and agencies to provide such proof swiftly and completely when demanded of 
them. For what lawful purpose and for what reason then, has the trial court failed to do its duty 
and comply with these mandates? 
Additionally, jurisdiction cannot be lawfully acquired by fraud. Respondent has repeatedly 
challenged the merely assumed and presumed jurisdiction of the trial court, and has demanded 
that lawful evidence (if it even existed) be placed on the records of the court, and that he be 
allowed to cross-examine any such evidence for fraud (as is his right according to the 
confrontation clauses), but all of his demands for proof of jurisdiction have simply been met 
with continued threats of 'contempt of court,' and no actual proof has been forthcoming. The 
courts are clear on this point: as the record does not show upon its face the facts necessary to 
give jurisdiction, they must be presumed to not have existed, and there can be no presumption in 
favor of jurisdiction [Norman v. Zieber, 3 Or at 202-03; 1 Smith's Leading Cases, 816], 
Unchallenged jurisdiction results in the court's exercise of presumptive jurisdiction, and such 
jurisdiction, though presumptive and never evidenced, would stand. However, the trial court's 
presumed jurisdiction has been lawfully and formally squarely challenged- But the court has 
refused to answer the challenge by providing the lawful evidence as required, as factually - it 
does not exist. A court cannot confer jurisdiction where none existed and cannot make a void 
proceeding valid [Old Wayne Mut L. Assoc, v. McDonough, 204 U.S, 8,27 S. Ct, 236 (1907)]. 
A properly executed jurisdictional challenge is supposed to stop a court dead in its tracks until 
the claims of jurisdiction have been properly evidenced, but that requirement has not seemed to 
stop the trial court. 
Since jurisdiction cannot be acquired by fraud, it can't possibly 'stand until disputed,' What 
stands is fraud - the mere presumption of jurisdiction. Since 'fraud vitiates everything, ab 
initio\ once jurisdiction is challenged, a court's failure to evidence such jurisdiction is also a 
fraud and a crime. And being that jurisdiction cannot be acquired by fraud - which includes 
failure to fully disclose, including by means of abusing superior knowledge of rules, process and 
procedure in order to avoid answering a challenge to jurisdiction directly, and whereas fraud 
vitiates everything, the failure to answer these and other questions has therein and thereby 
created a constitutional estopple. 
The specific elements of jurisdiction Respondent is challenging are as follows: 
Subject matter - as will be discussed later in this brief, the court had no jurisdiction to rule on or 
abrogate treaty rights, or to make a legal determination about the status and standing of the 
Pembina Nation Little Shell Band of North America, particularly without enjoining this 
indispensible third party to this case, or requiring original, first-hand evidence which would 
rebut the false and fraudulent claims and outright lies made by the Petitioner and her counsel. 
In personam - although Respondent was tricked and coerced under duress, to enter into the 
unconscionable contract called the Stipulation, once he was made aware of the fraud that was 
perpetrated against him, he promptly removed his signature from said 'contract5 via affidavit 
and has persisted in a manner so as to distance himself from the fraud and to attempt to bring the 
perpetrators to justice and to expose the lies and fraud for what they are. 
In rem - Respondent has also presented in this case specific questions and assertions that 
challenge and rebut the presumption that the State has any lawfully acquired interest in the 
person (legal status) or property of Respondent, or that the State has any lawfully acquired 
interest in the status and standing of the Pembina Nation Little Shell Band of North America. 
Sanctions cannot be imposed absent verified proof of jurisdiction or more especially when a 
sanction is pretending to turn a right into a crime [Standard v. Olsen, 74 S. Ct. 768; Sherar v. 
Cullen, 481 F.2d 946 (9th Cir. 1973); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978)]. 
Respondent is not an attorney, nor does he understand all of the nuances of the law, but he does 
know that his unalienable rights have been violated, and that the trial court has a mandate from 
the Supreme Court to 'liberally construe5 that which is filed by one proceeding without counsel 
[Haines v. Kerner, 404 US 519; 40 L.Ed 2d 652; 92 S.Ct. 594 (1972)]. The trial court has 
attempted to call Respondents' filings 'frivolous' yet they are fully supported by facts and 
constitutionally compliant law - i.e., lawful evidence, and Respondent has merely been 
exercising his First Amendment protected right to free speech and to petition for a redress of 
grievances in an attempt to protect his rights which have been summarily, arbitrarily and 
capriciously stripped from him, all without due process of law [United States v. Jackson, 390 
U.S. 570, 581 (1968)]. By its actions the trial court has made a determination that Respondent 
does not have a right to free speech and to petition for a redress of grievances, but this is 
completely inconsistent with settled law [Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, p 491; Hurtado v. 
California, 110 U.S. 516; Miller v. U.S. 230 F, 2d 486,489; Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 616]. 
Again, this goes to the root of the problem that statutory law and constitutional law are two 
entirely separate entities, as the Supreme Court has stated many times, and there exists no lawful 
evidence that can impose such body of law against the people without their knowledge or 
consent, or against their will Either the people have a God-given, inalienable Right to free 
speech and to redress for grievances, or they do not. Which is it? Are the people the sovereigns 
as declared in the Preamble to this nation's constitution, or are they merely slaves, or some form 
of government chattel? [Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1856); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 
U.S. (Dall 2) 419, 1 L. Ed. 440 (1793); 4 Wheat, 402] One cannot be both a slave and a free man 
at the same time. 
As jurisdiction can be challenged at anytime [Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co. 495 F 2d 906, 
910], even on appeal [Hill Top Developers v. Holiday Pines Service Corp. 478 So. 2d. 368 (Fla 
2nd DCA 1985)], Appellant is hereby requesting this court to review de novo this subject and to 
simultaneously review the trial court's alleged finding of jurisdiction to be in clear error, as it 
fails the fundamental requirements of determinative law as cited above. 
Furthermore, even if the trial court had jurisdiction, it has erred in its abuse of discretion to 
apply sanctions in this matter, but more importantly, has erred in its findings of fact that such 
body of statutory law even applies to Respondent, and most importantly, that sanctions can 
'pretend' to override rights protected by the constitutions. Therefore, appellant hereby asks the 
appeals court to further consider this matter de novo, to rule on how sanctions can even apply to 
this situation in particular, but more importantly, in general, how they can be applied to the 
sovereign people in the free exercise of their God-given inalienable rights as protected by the 
constitutions. 
Point 2 
Jurisdiction may not be acquired by fraud or by means of threat, duress and coercion; nor can it 
be conferred by a contract stipulation or agreement which itself fails to comply with all of the 
necessary and essential requirements of contract law. 
Eyen if the trial court had jurisdiction, which Respondent denies and which has never been 
properly evidenced, the underlying judgment itself is void for fraud and for lack of full 
disclosure [Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. 92,95, 353 SJS.2d 756, 758 (1987); U.S. v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 
297,199; U.S. v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021,1032; Carmine v- Bowen, 64 A.932], Any contract, 
agreement or stipulation must comply with all of the necessary and essential elements of 
contract law in order to be valid and binding upon all parties. Full disclosure of all of the terms 
and conditions of any contract/agreement/stipulation is a necessary and vital requirement in 
order to avoid fraud so that agreement is constitutionally compliant and thereby, valid and 
binding upon all parties [ Morrison v. Coddington, 662 P. 2d. 155,135 Ariz. 480 (1983)], 
And that 'agreement5 of the parties cannot be acquired by fraud, under threat, duress and 
coercion, which is exactly what the trial court did (i.e., threats of requiring Respondent to submit 
to a 'pseudo psychological evaluation' before he would be allowed to see his own children 
again) in order to get Respondent to 'agree' to the stipulation in the first place, by its use of 
undue influence and continuing threats of physical violence and force in order to get Respondent 
to 'comply' with its constitutionally void orders [Walls v. Walls, 99 S.W, 969, 30 Ky. Law Rep. 
948; Barber's Executors v. Baldwin's Executor, 138 Ky, 710,128 S.W. 1092; Livering's 
Executor v. Russell, 100 S.W. 840, 844, 30 Ky. Law Rep. 1185; United States v. Boch 
Oldsmobile, Inc., 909 F.2d 657, 661 (1st Cir. 1990)]. 
No one can factually 'agree9 to something that is against their will, yet when placed under a state 
of duress or out of fear, people often feel they have no alternative and capitulate, as revealed in 
this famous quote by Samuel Adams, which was the situation with respondent, as 'agreeing9 to 
the alleged stipulation placed respondent in a state of involuntary servitude: 
"If men, through fear, fraud, or mistake, should in terms renounce or give up any natural 
right, the eternal law of reason and the grand end of society would absolutely vacate such 
renunciation. The right to freedom being the gift of God, it is not in the power of man to 
alienate this gift and voluntarily become a slave." - Samuel Adams 
The trial court by its actions has made a flawed finding of fact and conclusion at law that a 
stipulation, itself void for fraud and for lack of full disclosure, can still be considered valid and 
binding upon the parties. Therefore, Appellant hereby requests this court to review this matter 
for clear error [23 Am J2d Fraud § 2; Orner v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307, 1310 (10th Cir. 1994)]. 
Point 3 
When a court uses hearsay as if it were lawful evidence, rules on subject matter that is beyond 
its jurisdiction or if it does not have in rem jurisdiction over certain aspects of the case, or if it 
fails to join an indispensible party to the proceedings, all of its orders and rulings are 
unquestionably void. 
Even if the trial court had jurisdiction, which Respondent denies and which has never been 
properly evidenced, the court went beyond its assumed and presumed jurisdiction and ruled on 
subject matter outside of the scope of its charter [Dillon v. Dillon, 187 P 27; People v. Ruiz 
(1990) 217 Cal. App. 3d 574,265 Cal Rptr. 886; Williamson v. Berry, 8 How. 945, 540 12 L. 
Ed. 1170,1189 (1850); Bradley v.Fisher, 13 Wall 335, 352]. The trial court erred in making a 
legal determination, and has continued to allow the appellee's counsel to make unsubstantiated 
claims as to the status and standing of the Pembina Nation Little Shell Band of North America, 
which indigenous tribal nation falls under the terms of the 1863 Old Crossing Treaty, and which 
people have already been recognized as a separate and distinct group who did not go to live on a 
reservation [Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians v. United States, 490 F.2d 935, 951 (Ct. 
CI. 1974)]. 
The trial court, without any lawful evidence* made a legal determination that the nation did not 
fall under the terms of the 1863 treaty and abrogated said treaty rights, yet only congress has the 
authority to do that, and only by making absolutely clear its intent to do so [Bradley v, Fisher; 
13 Wall 335, 352]. Whether the Pembina Nation retains treaty rights under the 1863 Old 
Crossing treaty is of far greater significance than this single case, and the Pembina Nation itself 
is not a disinterested third party to these proceedings [U.S. v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905); 
UNITED STATES of America et al, Plaintiffs, and Samish, Snohomish, Snoqualime and 
Steilacoom Indian Tribes, Plaintiffs-Intervenor/Appellants, and Duwamish Indian Tribe, 
Plaintiff-Intervenor/Appellant, v, STATE OF WASHINGTON et al, Defendants.641 F.2d 1368 
(1981), United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit]. 
The abrogation of treaty rights is a federal question over which only congress has authority to 
decide, and which may not be decided by a mere state court, especially without providing any 
lawful evidence supporting the appellee's false and fraudulent claims. Hearsay cannot be 
accepted as 'evidence5 by any stretch of the imagination, in any court of law that still upholds 
the constitution and the treaties as the supreme law of the land. Accordingly, all orders and 
judgments made by the trial court are null and void due to the fact the court ruled on subject 
matter outside of the scope of its jurisdiction [Hill Top Developers v. Holiday Pines Service 
Corp. 478 So. 2d. 368 (Fla 2nd DCA 1985); Lubben v. Selective Service System, 453 F.2d 645, 
649 (1st Cir. 1972); Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. 65, at 66 (1857)]. 
The trial court has also allowed assumptions, presumptions, hearsay, third party information, the 
un-sworn statements of counsel, and the outright lies of the petitioner to stand as if it were 
somehow 'lawful evidence' in that courtroom, contrary to the confrontation clauses of the Sixth 
and Seventh Amendments and the Fifth Amendment right to due process and contrary to your 
own rules of evidence. The petitioner's counsel has brought forth many legal theories5 about 
the Pembina Nation Little Shell Band of North America, and has refused to bring forth any 
lawful evidence upon the records of the court supporting those theories, yet the trial court has 
bought Mr. Hard's arguments lock, stock and barrel, ignoring all evidence provided by 
Respondent. Respondent has repeatedly demanded that lawful evidence of such claims be 
brought forward for cross-examination, but this request has gone ignored by the court. 
Consequently, the trial court has erred in its determination that it even had subject matter 
jurisdiction to abrogate the treaty rights of members of the Pembina Nation in general, and 
Respondent in particular, and in rem jurisdiction to determine the status and standing of the 
Pembina Nation itself. Appellant hereby requests the appeals court to review this determination 
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for clear error and to review de novo and to declare a finding of law that the subject matter and 
in rem jurisdictions of the status and standing of the Pembina Nation and its treaty rights lies 
outside of the trial court's jurisdiction, and that the Pembina Nation Little Shell Band of North 
America itself, is not a disinterested third party to these proceedings, and that if the trial court 
wishes to pursue this matter, it would have to properly enjoin the missing party so that the 
falsehoods and lies spread throughout this case can be rebuked and rebutted with proper 
authority and lawful evidence to the contrary. Additionally, this finding of fact would then 
require this court to declare all orders, rulings and judgments made by the trial court to be a 
legal nullity, as it completely exceeded its jurisdiction and ruled on subject matter outside the 
scope of its authorized charter [Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. 92, 95, 353 S.E.2d 756, 758 (1987); 
Omer v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307,1310 (10th Cir. 1994)]. 
Subsequently, as the trial court has also erred in its determination of what constitutes 'lawful 
evidence', appellant respectfully requests the court to review and declare these 'findings of fact' 
made by the trial court to be the clear errors that they are. 
Point 4 
The underlying judgments are unquestionably void for complete and utter denial of due process 
of law afforded the sovereign people. 
Even if the trial court had jurisdiction, which Respondent denies and which has never been 
properly evidenced, the Fourth District Court and Judge Stott were engaged in acts contrary to 
the due process requirements necessary to protect the unalienable rights of the people, and 
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therefore any judgments rendered are unquestionably void as an operation of law [Eckel v. 
MacNeal, 628 N.E.2d 741 (111. App. Dist. 1993)]. 
Respondent has attempted to exercise his constitutionally protected unalienable natural Rights 
and Treaty Rights throughout the course of these proceedings, but has repeatedly been subjected 
to bias, prejudice and racial discrimination by Judge Stott, contrary to the neutrality 
requirements of any judicial officer [28 USC Sec. 455; Marshall v. Jerrico Inc., 446 US 238, 242, 
100 S.Ct. 1610, 64 L. Ed. 2d 182 (1980); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259-262,266-267 
(1978)]. But this is not a new position for this particular judge. Judge Stott has previously been 
in a similar position as he has a history of being biased and prejudiced towards members of a 
Native American nation which is not considered 'federally recognized,5 and the Utah Supreme 
Court has already reversed and remanded that error [State v. Mooney, 2004 WL 1380539, 
Docket No. 20010787)]. 
Therefore, Judge Stott not only exceeded, but operated completely outside of his assumed and 
presumed jurisdiction thereby violating Respondent's fundamental rights to due process by 
failing to provide responsive answers to the questions of law placed before him that directly 
related to the proceedings at hand and consequently caused Respondent injury [Wuest v. Wuest, 
127 P2d 934, 937; Yates Vs. Village of Hoffinan Estates, Illinois, 209 F.Supp. 757 (N.D. Ill 
1962); Owen v. Independence, 100 S.CT. 1398,445 US 622; Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 
1974]. 
The courts have an absolute mandate to protect the rights of the people, as is evidenced from the 
following citation: "No higher duty rests upon this Court than to exert its full authority to 
prevent all violations of the principles of the Constitution." [Downs v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 
(1901)]. State courts, like federal courts, have a constitutional obligation to safeguard personal 
liberties and to uphold federal law rStonev Powell 428 US 465,483 n. 35,96 S. Ct 3037,49 L. 
Ed, 2d 1067 (1976)], yet this requirement has been disregarded in the trial court. 
Respondent is not an attorney, nor has he had any formal legal training, so any of his filings, 
pleadings or questions about the proceedings should be 'liberally construed', yet Judge Stott 
made a legal determination unsupported by fact or law that Respondent understood the nature 
and cause of the proceedings against him when he did not, and Judge Stott refused to provide 
responsive answers to the questions Respondent was attempting to ask to determine that nature 
and cause, and labeled them merely as an 'inquisition,' This act conflicts with his previous 
'testimony' that Respondent should be required to undergo a pseudo-psychological 'evaluation' 
to determine if and when he would be 'allowed' to see his own children again. His 'testimony' is 
therefore in conflict and must be impeached, and this 'finding of fact' by the trial court declared 
as pure error. 
Judge Stott refused to answer Respondent's questions about how the 'contempt' proceedings 
could be valid if the underlying judgment itself was void, as Judge Stott boldly declared: "I'm 
not going to answer that". All judicial officers are required to take an oath of office to protect 
and defend the constitution, and to be fair to all litigants, yet Judge Stott appears to have 
violated said required oath of office and has blatantly refused to provide any due process of law, 
as can be clearly discerned from the transcript of the hearing [Merritt v. Hunter, C.A. Kansas 
170 F2d 739]. Due process of law is the principle that the government must respect all of a 
person's legal and unalienable rights instead of just some, or most of those legal rights, 
especially when depriving one of life, liberty, or property. To deny due process of law as 
defined is treason against the people as it makes war on the constitution, and this act alone is 
punishable by impeachment [Cooper Vs. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S.Ct. 1401 (1958); Article VI, 
Sections 2-3 of the U.S. Constitution; US v Will, 449 US 200, 216,101 S. Ct, 471, 66 L.Ed.2nd 
392, 406 (1980); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 US (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821)]. 
Due process under the U.S. Constitution not only restrains the executive and judicial branches, 
but additionally restrains the legislative branch, as the people cannot be deprived of their life, 
liberty or property by mere legislative acts, or 'statutes'[ Brown v. Hummel, 6 Pa 86 (1847); 
Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856); Taylor v. Porter (4 Hill, 145)]. Specifically, what 
part about '...none of these things can be done by mere legislation5 in the later cited decision 
above does the trial court and judge not understand? 
Procedural due process, essentially the concept of "fundamental fairness," includes 
Respondent's right to be adequately notified of charges or proceedings involving him, and the 
opportunity to be heard at those proceedings, which Respondent was also denied. Incidentally, 
Respondent was never served with any 'summons5 for the alleged contempt hearing, as he was 
in the courtroom that day for a pre-trial scheduling conference on his Motion for Void Judgment, 
which he verified with the court clerk was scheduled for that day, but which the Judge Stott 
'removed5 from the business of the court that day. Respondent never received a copy of the 
alleged 'Ex Parte Order to Show Cause,5 or Summons and was therefore unprepared for the 
events that transpired that day. 
Substantive due process refers to a requirement that laws and regulations be related to a 
legitimate government interest (e.g., crime prevention) and not contain provisions that result in 
the unfair or arbitrary treatment of an individual [Taylor v. Porter., 4 Hill. 140,146 (1843) 
Justice Bronson; State v. Simon., 2 Spears 761,767 (1884) Justice O'Neal]. The 5th 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States clearly states that "no person shall.. .be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Fundamental to procedural 
due process are adequate notice before the government can deprive one of life, liberty, or 
property, and the opportunity to be heard and defend one's rights. This unalienable right is 
protected by Amendment V of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Utah 
constitution. 
There is absolutely no discretion in this area to abuse the fundamental rights of the individual to 
be heard and more particularly, to be able to understand the nature and cause of the proceedings 
against him. There is also no discretion in this area to abuse the fundamental rights of the 
individual to be heard and to provide responsive answers to questions regarding the proceedings 
against him, or more particularly, to exercise undue influence against one as a means by which 
to deprive him of his rights [United States v. Boch Oldsmobile, Inc., 909 F.2d 657, 661 (1st Cir. 
1990); Jaffe and Asher v. Van Brunt, S.D.N.Y. 1994,158 F.R.D. 278; Walls v. Walls, 99 S.W. 
969,30 Ky. Law Rep. 948; Barber's Executors v. Baldwin's Executor, 138 Ky. 710,128 S.W. 
1092; Livering's Executor v. Russell, 100 S.W. 840, 844, 30 Ky. Law Rep. 1185]- Accordingly, 
all orders, rulings and judgments made by Judge Stott must be overturned, most notably the 
'finding of contempt9 order made on Dec. 1, 2006, for failure to provide due process of law and 
protect the unalienable rights of one of the People [United States vs. Lee, 106 U.S. [196,] 220, 
[27 L.Ed. 171, 1 S. Ct. 240] (1882); 438 US, at 506, 57 L. Ed. 2d 895, 98 S. Ct. 2894; 261 Kan. 
At 862; United States v. Boch Oldsmobile, Inc. 909 F.2d 657, 661 (1st Cir. 1990)]. 
Point 5 
There is no known or disclosed constitutionally delegated authority to impose that foreign body 
of law known as statutory law upon the sovereign people while acting in their private, non-
commercial capacities. 
Even if the trial court had jurisdiction, which Respondent denies and which has never been 
properly evidenced, there has been no lawful evidence placed upon the records of the trial court 
that proves that the foreign body of law called statutory law itself even applies to the sovereign 
people in general, or to Respondent in particular, acting in their private, non-commercial 
capacities. Yet this appears to be the system of law that the trial court has been operating under, 
which body of law cannot apply to Respondent without his permission or consent (and the trial 
court has neither), especially when the Supreme Court has ruled numerous times that the people 
are unquestionably sovereign [Yick Wo v. Hopkins (118 U.S. 356, 370); Kawananakoa v. 
Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353,27 S. Ct. 526, 527, 51 L. Ed. 834 (1907); Lansing vs. Smith, 21 
D.89; Martin vs. Waddell, 41 US (16 Pet) 367,410 (1842); 4 Wheat, 402; Jillird v. Greenman, 
110 U.S. 421; the Preambles to the constitutions; the ninth amendment to the US constitution]. 
The trial court has moved against Respondent under statutory law, particularly in this instant 
matter, finding Respondent in 'contempt of court9 according to some statute, yet this 'secret' 
system of law is not enumerated in any constitution and there is no known documentation of it 
detailing from which constitution it arises or in which Article, Section and Clause - or to whom 
it applies and when. It's derivation of authority is unknown, and that alone is a violation of due 
process, which the Supreme Court has clearly stated must follow the rules of the common law 
[United Bank vs. Mesa Nelson Co., 121 Ariz 438, 590 P2d 1384, 25 U.CCRS 1113]. The 
courts have been very clear on this issue, that statutory jurisdiction and constitutional 
jurisdiction are completely separate and distinct, and that statutes employing the word of art 
term 'person9 normally exclude the sovereign [Wilson v. Omaha Tribe, 442 U.S. 653,667 
(1979); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S., 147,174,176; Carter v, Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S., 238; 
Norton vs. Shelby County, 118, US 425 p. 442; 16 Am Jur 2d, Sec. 177, late 2d, Sec 256; 
Downes v. Bidwell (1901) 21 S.Ct 770, 182 U.S. 244, 45 Led. 1088; United States v. Price Et 
Al. 383 U.S. 787; 86 S.Ct. 1152; 1966 U.S. Lexis 1963]. Additionally, it is well settled in law 
that the people cannot be deprived of life, liberty or property except by due process of law, 
wherein the facts and the law are judged according to a jury of ones peers. The taking of life, 
liberty or property can under no circumstances be accomplished by mere legislature alone 
[Brown v. Hummel, 6 Pa 86 (1847); Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856); Taylor v. 
Porter (4 Hill, 145)]. 
What exact Article, Section and Clause in the Constitution granted the government unlimited 
power to regulate the affairs of the people acting in their private capacities? [Wynhammer v. 
People, 13 NY (378); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43; Curley vs. U.S., 130 F. 1, 8,64 CCA. 369] 
— " - ^ ^ 
What presumption of law is the court operating under to pretend that authority exists to impose 
this secret system of law (statutory law) against the sovereign people without their knowledge or 
informed consent, or even against their will? [Cruden v. Neale, 2 N.C. 338 (1796) 2 S.E. 70; 
Starkey Construction Inc. vs. Eicon, Inc., 248 Ark 958, 978A, 457 SW 2nd 509, 7 U.C.C.RS 
923] There is absolutely no constitutionally delegated authority for such actions. It is 
unconstitutional in nature, and is therefore inapplicable to the sovereign people, as there is no 
constitutional authority to impose it upon them, particularly without their knowledge or consent, 
or especially against their will. The people are guaranteed a Republican form of government, not 
a mere Democracy under which the will of the majority is obligatory and binding upon all others. 
Therefore, as the trial court has refused to answer or appropriately rule upon this challenge, 
Respondent hereby requests the appeals court to rule upon and review this finding of law de 
novo, and that it rule only according to constitutionally complaint law and case law, and that it 
fully disclose in its written decision any underlying assumptions and presumptions of law it will 
use, or that the trial court has used, in making its determination and finding of fact in this regard. 
Conclusion 
For all the foregoing reasons, the Court must reverse the trial court's orders and remand this 
matter for additional discovery and trial should it be found that the trial court even had 
jurisdiction in order to proceed in this matter in the first place. These proceedings must return to 
the Rule of Law and the court must again begin to comply with the highest law of the land. 
DATED: May 8,2007 
Respectfully submitted, 
All Rights Reserved without Prejudice, 
Robert Matthew Mulder, in Propria Persona 
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Addendum to Brief of Appellant, pursuant to your Rule 24(a)(l 1) 
Preamble to the Constitution of the United States of America: 
We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish 
justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general 
welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and 
establish this Constitution for the United States of America. 
Article VI, Sections 2-3 of the Constitution of the United States of America: 
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance 
thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound 
thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. 
l l 
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the members of the several state 
legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of the United States and of the 
several states, shall be bound by oath or affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no 
religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under 
the United States. 
Amendment I to the Constitution of the United States of America: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of 
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of 
grievances. 
Amendment V to the Constitution of the United States of America: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval 
forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall 
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation. 
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Amendment VI to the Constitution of the United States of America: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, 
by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, 
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the 
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to 
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance 
of counsel for his defense. 
Amendment VII to the Constitution of the United States of America: 
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the 
right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise 
reexamined in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common 
law-
Amendment IX to the Constitution of the United States of America: 
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or 
disparage others retained by the people. 
Preamble to the Utah Constitution: 
Grateful to Almighty God for life and liberty, we, the people of Utah, in order to secure 
and perpetuate the principles of free government, do ordain and establish this 
CONSTITUTION. 
Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Article IV of the 1778 Treaty: 
For the better security of the peace and friendship now entered into by the contracting 
parties, against all infractions of the same by the citizens of either party, to the prejudice 
of the other, neither party shall proceed to the infliction of punishments on the citizens of 
the other, otherwise than by securing the offender or offenders by imprisonment, or any 
other competent means, till a fair and impartial trial can be had by judges or juries of both 
parties, as near as can be to the laws, customs and usages of the contracting parties and 
natural justice. The mode of such trials to be hereafter fixed by the wise men of the 
United States in Congress assembled, with the assistance of such deputies of the 
Delaware nation, as may be appointed to act in concert with them in adjusting this matter 
to their mutual liking. And it is further agreed between the parties aforesaid, that neither 
shall entertain or give countenance to the enemies of the other, or protect in their 
respective states, criminal fugitives, servants or slaves, but the same to apprehend, and 
secure and deliver to the State or States, to which such enemies, criminals, servants or 
slaves respectively belong. 
Article I of the 1863 Old Crossing Treaty: 
The peace and friendship now existing between the United States and the Red Lake and 
Pembina bands of Chippewa Indians shall be perpetual. 
Article 7 of the 1866 Treaty: 
The Choctaws and Chickasaws agree to such legislation as Congress and the President of 
the United States may deem necessary for the better administration of justice and the 
protection of the rights of person and property within the Indian Territory: Provided, 
however, Such legislation shall not in anywise interfere with or annul their present tribal 
organization, or their respective legislatures or judiciaries, or the rights, laws, privileges, 
or customs of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations respectively. 
Article 8, Section 4 of the 1866 Treaty: 
The general assembly shall have power to legislate upon all subjects and matters 
pertaining to the intercourse and relations of the Indian tribes and nations resident in the 
said Territory, the arrest and extradition of criminals escaping from one tribe to another, 
the administration of justice between members of the several tribes of the said Territory, 
and persons other than Indians and members of said tribes or nations, the construction of 
works of internal improvement, and the common defence and safety of the nations of the 
said Territory. All laws enacted by said council shall take effect at the times therein 
provided, unless suspended by the Secretary of the Interior or the President of the United 
States. No law shall be enacted inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States or 
the laws of Congress, or existing treaty stipulations with the United States; nor shall said 
council legislate upon matters pertaining to the legislative, judicial, or other organization, 
laws, or customs of the several tribes or nations, except as herein provided for. 
Article 8, Section 8 of the 1866 Treaty: 
The Choctaws and Chickasaws also agree that a court or courts may be established in 
said Territory with such jurisdiction and organization as Congress may prescribe: 
Provided, That the same shall not interfere with the local judiciary of either of said 
nations. 
Article 38 of the 1866 Treaty: 
Every white person who, having married a Choctaw or Chickasaw, resides in the said 
Choctaw or Chickasaw Nation, or who has been adopted by the legislative authorities, is 
to be deemed a member of said nation, and shall be subject to the laws of the Choctaw 
and Chickasaw Nations according to his domicile, and to prosecution and trial before 
their tribunals, and to punishment according to their laws in all respects as though he was 
a native Choctaw or Chickasaw. 
Article 45 of the 1866 Treaty: 
All the rights, privileges, and immunities heretofore possessed by said nations or 
individuals thereof, or to which they were entitled under the treaties and legislation 
heretofore made and had in connection with them, shall be, and are hereby declared to be, 
in full force, so far as they are consistent with the provisions of this treaty. 
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Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
{Q^IQC? peputy 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH--PROVO DIVISION 
TAMARA ROWLEY MULDER 
Petitioner/Plaintiff 
vs. 
ROBERT MATTHEW MULDER 
Respondent/Defendant 
FINDINGS 
OF FACTS AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 054401811 
Judge: Stott 
Commissioner: Patton 
This action came on for consideration and hearing on Petitioner's Motion for 
Entry of a Default Divorce on December 1,2005. Petitioner was present and represented 
by her counsel. Respondent/Defendant was not present despite having been advised the 
prior week that this hearing was going forward. Mr. Gregory J. Christiansen entered an 
appearance on behalf of the Respondent/Defendant. Based upon the review of the file and 
the information presented, the Court hereby adopts the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
A. FINDINGS OF FACT REGARDING DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE. 
1. The Court finds that the Plaintiff is a bona fide and actual resident of Utah 
County, State of Utah and had been a legal resident for a period in excess of three 
(3) months prior to the commencement of the above-entitled action. 
2. The Court finds that the Plaintiff and Defendant are wife and husband, 
respectively, having been married on September 29,1984. 
3. The Court finds that the parties have irreconcilable differences. The Court 
understands that so long as the terms set forth herein are not challenged, that 
Plaintiff waives any claim for alimony, alimony based on "cause" and seeks no 
marital property other than the personal property she and the parties' children 
currently possess. 
4. The Court finds that the parties have six (6) children bom of their issue: Richard 
bornMy9,1985; Nathan bom November 11,1986; David bom May 7,1988; 
Peter bom January 1,1993; Theodore bom October 23,1996; and Charity born 
August 2,1999. 
5. The Court finds that the Plaintiff should be awarded the sole physical and legal 
custody of the parties' minor children and that the Defendant should be awarded 
reasonable rights of visitation after an evaluation and further hearing to determine 
the conditions of such visitation. 
6. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has not been employed outside of the parties' 
residence for a substantial period of time and that Defendant is a computer 
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programmer who was making at least $55000 per month during his last full time 
employment. Accordingly, the Court will impute income to the Defendant of 
$5,000 per month and the Plaintiff $0 per month for the calculation of child 
support under the Uniform Child Support guidelines. The Court finds that 
payment of this child support in the amount of $1,450 per month should 
commence December 5, 2005. This calculation of child support may be re-
considered after one year from the date of these Findings. 
7. The Court finds that it is fair, just and equitable that each of the parties should be 
ordered to assume, pay, discharge and hold the other party harmless from any 
existing debts or obligations incurred separately by them since the 
commencement of the above-entitled action; and that they should each be 
required to so inform their respective creditors. Notwithstanding the foregoing, 
Plaintiff shall have no responsibility for payments to Defendant's brother for any 
time during which the Plaintiff lived on the Defendant's brother's property in 
California. The allocation of pre-petition debts, if any, shall be subject of further 
hearings subject to all legal and equitable considerations. 
8. The Court finds that the Plaintiff is entitled to immediately begin using her 
maiden name of Tamara Lynn Rowley. 
9. All statutory waiting periods are waived as there is no chance for reconciliation. 
10. Any claims for Defendant to pay Plaintiffs reasonable attorney's fees and costs 
are reserved for further proceedings. 
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B. FINDINGS OF FACT RELATED TO THE ENTRY OF A DEFAULT DECREE OF 
DIVORCE AND THE EFFECT OF FILINGS RELATED TO THE PEMBINA 
NATION LITTE SHELL BAND OF NORTH AMERICA. 
11. That Plaintiff filed this action on September 7,2005. 
12. That Defendant was personally served with a copy of the Summons and 
Complaint in this action on September 13,2005. 
13. That Defendant filed a Notice of Removal and Automatic Stay, purportedly based 
upon the Defendant's membership in the "Pembina Nation Little Shell Band of 
North America." 
14. That Defendant failed to timely file any answer, motion to dismiss, or other 
pleading required by Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
15. That the "Pembina Nation Little Shell Band of North America" (hereinafter 
referred to as "Pembina") is not a federally-recognized tribe. Accordingly, no 
orders or decrees of this organization have any validity, weight or bearing in any 
legal proceeding before this court. 
16. That the Plaintiff is not of Indian heritage and is not a lineal descendant of any 
Native American. 
17. That Pembina has no personal or subject matter jurisdiction over her. 
18. That the Defendant contends that he has been named as a "Tribal Judge" by 
Pembina and that in his capacity as "Tribal Judge" he has issued a Divorce Decree 
dissolving his marriage to Plaintiff. Although this document has no legal effect 
whatsoever* it indicates the acceptance or acquiescence of a order dissolving the 
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marriage by this Court. Further, Defendant's counsel represented that Defendant 
does not oppose the dissolution of the marriage. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the Court has in personam and subject matter jurisdiction. 
2. That the default of the Defendant should be entered herein and the Plaintiff 
awarded a Decree of Divorce from the Defendant on the grounds of irreconcilable 
differences subject to further order or findmgs of dissolution for cause. 
3. That to the extent the foregoing Findings of Fact are Conclusions of Law, the 
same are incorporated herein by reference and made a part hereof. 
4. That the Pembina Nation Little Shell Band of North America is not a federally-
recognized tribe and there is no statute or treaty requiring recognition of any 
documents from that organization. Accordingly, the "Notice of Removal and 
Automatic Stay," the "Divorce Decree" and other documents filed claiming 
authority from the "Pembina Nation Little Shell Band of North America" are a 
legal nullity with no force or effect upon the Plaintiff or this Court. 
DATED this _2L ^ y of [^SJ^AJ^—; 2005. 
BY THE COURT 
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